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I.   INTRODUCTION
The family, a central institution in our society, is threatened, dis-
rupted, and undermined by domestic violence. Approximately
ninety-five percent of this violence is inflicted by a man upon a
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woman.1 Every fifteen seconds,2 or six million times per year,3 a
woman is battered. Domestic violence transcends age, race, religion,
cultural heritage, and socio-economic status, and immigrant women,
like many others, are extremely vulnerable.4
Seeking to promote family unity, United States immigration pol-
icy confers certain advantages upon family-sponsored immigrants.
For example, there is no restriction on the number of “immediate
relatives” of U.S. citizens permitted to immigrate each year.5 The
term “immediate relatives” means certain children, spouses, and
parents of citizens of the United States.6 Furthermore, first and sec-
ond preferences for applicants for the limited visas are given to im-
migrants who desire to enter the United States because of close
family relationships.7 Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
are granted first preference under the system of family sponsorship.8
Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident
aliens are granted second preference.9 Because of numerical limita-
tions, spouses of permanent residents must wait an average of two
years and three months before receiving a visa.10 In contrast, there
is almost no waiting period for spouses of U.S. citizens.11
                                                                                                                 
1. See Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 3): Joint Hearings on S. 358 Before the Immi-
gration, Refugees, and Int’l Law Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm. and the Immi-
gration Task Force of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 852-53
(1990) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (joint statement of Asian Women’s Shelter et al.).
2.  See id. at 852 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR 1983 (1984)).
3. See H.R.J. Res. 178, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted).
4. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 853; Maxine Yi Hwa Lee, A Life Preserver for
Battered Immigrant Women: The 1990 Amendments to the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 779, 781-82 (1993) (estimating the extent of abuse against
immigrant women by correlating statistics on domestic violence in general with statistics
on immigrant entrance, statements from hotline shelters catering to immigrant communi-
ties, and the number of conditional resident spouses seeking waivers).
The following example illustrates the problems facing battered immigrant women:
Katrina came to the U.S. three years ago with her mother and her American
husband whom she had married in the Philippines. Katrina is undocumented, but
her two year old daughter is a U.S. citizen. As an undocumented woman married
to a U.S. citizen, Katrina’s legal residency depends upon her husband’s willing-
ness to verify the “legitimacy” of their marriage in an interview with the INS. Ka-
trina’s husband has beaten her repeatedly during the past two years and recently
he forced her mother to move out of the house and move in with a friend. Katrina
finally sought help from a battered women’s shelter but soon returned to her hus-
band when he threatened to report her to the INS and have her deported.
Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 858.
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994).
6. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
7. See id. § 1153(a).
8. See id. § 1153(a)(1).
9. See id. § 1153(a)(2).
10. See Margaret M.R. O’Herron, Note, Ending the Abuse of the Marriage Fraud Act,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 549, 552 (1993).
11. See Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985)
1997]                   IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD 681
Under the system of family sponsorship, either a U.S. citizen or
an alien who is a lawful permanent resident (LPR) may file a peti-
tion with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to ob-
tain immigration status for his or her spouse.12 Before 1986, the INS
merely interviewed applicants who desired residence to determine
the validity of the marriage.13 If the immigration officer determined
that the marriage was entered into in good faith, the immigrant
beneficiary qualified for unconditional permanent residence.14
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments (IMFA) to counter the perceived problem of immi-
grants entering into sham marriages to receive priority immigration
status.15 Part II of this Comment reviews the history of the IMFA.
Part III highlights the IMFA’s unintended consequences. Part IV
examines the Immigration Act of 1990, which was designed, in part,
to correct flaws in the IMFA. Part V discusses the problems left un-
resolved by the 1990 Act. Part VI examines the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which also was designed, in
part, to correct flaws in the IMFA. Part VII discusses the problems
still left unresolved by the 1994 Act. Part VIII offers suggestions for
reforming U.S. immigration policy to eliminate the unintended
negative consequences of the IMFA. Finally, Part IX concludes that
because of its continued disastrous impact on alien spouses, the
IMFA should be repealed.
II.   IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD AMENDMENTS OF 1986
A.   Policy Behind Enactment
Congress enacted the IMFA to balance the competing policies of
promoting family reunification and preventing marriage fraud.16
The outcry for reform was tremendous. During debate on the matter,
one congressman noted: “Because spouses of U.S. citizens and per-
manent resident aliens are . . . given special consideration under our
immigration laws, many aliens who would not otherwise be allowed
to live in the United States find it expedient to enter into a fraudu-
lent marriage.”17 INS surveys estimated that as many as thirty per-
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter IMF Hearings] (statement of Sen. Alan K. Simpson). “By virtue of a simple
ceremony taking only a few minutes, marriage to a United States citizen confers ‘most fa-
vored alien’ status on the beneficiary and almost instantly results in immigrant status as no
visa number . . . is necessary.” Id. at 7 (statement of INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson).
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
13. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 552.
14. See id.
15. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100
Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1184, 1186a (1994)).
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
17. 132 CONG. REC. H27,015 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Romano L.
Mazzoli).
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cent of all spousal petitions involved marital fraud.18 According to
the INS commissioner, marriage fraud posed a significant threat to
the integrity of the immigration system19 because marriage was the
easiest and most frequently used means of obtaining permanent
resident status.20
B.   Conditional Status
Under the IMFA, a woman petitioning as an immigrant spouse is
admitted as a “conditional” resident alien after her initial petition is
approved.21 The conditional status is contingent upon her ability to
maintain a valid, two-year marriage.22 The INS can terminate the
conditional status before the completion of the two-year period if the
marriage is determined to be a sham used to confer a beneficial
immigration status upon the alien.23 To initiate removal of the con-
ditional status, both the alien spouse and the citizen are required to
file a petition for removal of conditional status24 within ninety days
of the second anniversary of the alien spouse obtaining the condi-
tional status.25 The alien spouse can be deported if the U.S. citizen
does not file the petition in time or attend—along with the alien
spouse—a personal interview with the INS.26 An exception allows
the couple to demonstrate “good cause” for any late filing of the pe-
tition.27
After a petition for removal is properly filed, the INS interviews
the couple to determine if the marriage is bona fide.28 If the petition
is granted, the conditional status is removed and the alien becomes
an LPR on the second anniversary of the marriage.29 If the INS finds
the marriage was “entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s
                                                                                                                 
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978. This es-
timate, however, was at best misleading. See discussion infra Part VIII.A.
19. See IMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of INS Commissioner Alan C.
Nelson).
20. See id. at 7.
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) (1994).
22. See id. § 1186a(b)(1).
23. See id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 216.3(a) (1997). The IMFA grants the power
to make this decision to the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1); however, the Attor-
ney General has delegated to the INS the authority to administer and enforce the IMFA and
all other immigration laws, see 8 C.F.R. § 100.2(a). Thus, for simplicity’s sake, this Comment
refers to the INS when the immigration law in question specifies the Attorney General.
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (1994).
25. See id. § 1186a(d)(2)(A).
26. See id. § 1186a(c)(2)(A).
27. See id. § 1186a(d)(2)(B).
28. See id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(b)(1) (1997) (requiring the regional
service center director “to determine whether to waive the interview required by the Act. If
satisfied that the marriage was not for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, the
regional service center director may waive the interview and approve the petition.”).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B) (1994).
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entry as an immigrant,”30 “has been judicially annulled or termi-
nated,”31 or was the result of a consideration paid to the resident to
file the petition to gain a beneficial immigration status for the alien,
the INS must terminate the resident status of the alien.32 Such a
termination renders the alien subject to deportation proceedings.33
C.   Hardship Waiver
The INS has discretionary power under the IMFA to grant a
hardship waiver that removes the conditional basis of the perma-
nent residency status if certain conditions are met.34 As originally
enacted, the hardship waiver provision required the immigrant
woman to prove that extreme hardship would result from deporta-
tion,35 or that the marriage had been entered into in good faith, the
marriage had been terminated by her for good cause, and she had
not been at fault in failing to meet the requirements of the petition
to remove the conditional status.36 However, whether the waiver is
ultimately granted is at the discretion of the INS.37 In determining
hardship, the INS can only consider evidence developed during the
time the alien was under conditional status.38 Originally, an alien
who was denied removal of conditional residency was not entitled to
an appeal, but could merely request a review of the final decision
during deportation proceedings.39
III.   SHORTCOMINGS OF THE IMFA
A.   Good Faith Requirement
The hardship waiver provision’s still-existing requirement that a
marriage be entered into in good faith40 discourages immigrant
women from escaping abusive spouses. For example, even if the
marriage was entered into in good faith from the immigrant wife’s
perspective,41 the husband can easily fabricate an allegation that
                                                                                                                 
30. Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i).
31. Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
32. See id. § 1186a(b)(1)(B).
33. See id. § 1186a(b)(2).
34. See id. § 1186a(c)(4).
35. See id. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
36. See id. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 §
701(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085 (striking out the requirement that the marriage be terminated
by the alien spouse for good cause); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994).
38. See id.
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(f) (1994); cf. id. § 204.2(c)(3) (1997) (granting a notice and full
hearing options for aliens denied self-petitions).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(C)(4)(B) (1994).
41. There also are cases in which both parties entered into the marriage in good faith,
but one or both eventually realized that it was a mistake. For example, suppose that the
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would discredit and rebut his wife’s good faith allegations, simply as a
vindictive and retaliatory measure to burden her petition for waiver.
B.   Initiation of Divorce Requirement
In its original form, the hardship waiver did not apply in a di-
vorce unless the immigrant spouse initiated the divorce.42 Thus, the
spouses would race to the courthouse to attempt to be first to file for
divorce.43 The immigrant spouse was at a disadvantage in this race
because initiating divorce proceedings could anger the battering
spouse, causing an escalation of abuse. Also, the immigrant spouse
often could not afford legal representation or even find adequate
representation because of language barriers.44
C.   Termination for Good Cause Requirement
Originally, the hardship waiver was not available in a divorce
unless the marriage was terminated for good cause.45 In states with
no-fault divorce laws, it was not always possible for an immigrant
woman to show that the marriage was terminated for good cause be-
cause specific facts could not be alleged when filing for a divorce.46
Thus, under the IMFA in its original form, immigrant women in
these states had difficulties creating a record showing that divorce
proceedings were initiated for good cause.47
D.   Applicability If Initial Petition Is Not Filed
Currently, the hardship waiver provision only exempts the joint
filing requirements to have the conditional status removed, and does
not protect an alien whose spouse never filed the initial petition to
                                                                                                                 
parties ceased to cohabit because one physically abused the other. In that case, one can say
that the abused spouse made a mistake. Such a mistake, however, would not constitute an
act of fraud or a sham marriage. See IMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 33 (statement of
Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State for Visa Services Vernon D. Penner, Jr.).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (requiring that the marriage be
“terminated . . . by the alien spouse . . . .”), amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-649 § 701(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085 (striking out the requirement that the marriage be
terminated by the alien spouse); see also H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 51 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6731 (listing numerous factors that interfere with a battered
spouse’s ability to initiate a divorce); discussion supra Part IV.B.
43. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 554.
44. See Deeana Jang, Triple Jeopardy: The Plight of Battered Immigrants and Refu-
gee Women, 19 IMMIGR. NEWSL. 6, 6 (1990).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (requiring that the marriage be
terminated “for good cause”), amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 §
701(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085 (striking out the requirement that the marriage be terminated
for good cause); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
46. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 554.
47. See id.
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establish conditional residency.48 An alien may be under the belief
that she is waiting to file for the final interview, and only then real-
ize that she is in the United States illegally because the initial peti-
tion for conditional residency has not been filed. Thus, before subse-
quent amendments to the IMFA allowed the alien spouse to self-
petition for conditional residency,49 any alien in this position, or one
who was told by the spouse that an initial petition was never filed,
was very reluctant to come forward because of the risk of immediate
deportation.
E.   Withdrawal of Initial Petition
An abusive spouse, whether a U.S. citizen or a conditional per-
manent resident, can withdraw the initial petition for permanent
residency at any time before the end of the two year conditional pe-
riod.50 Thus, before the IMFA was amended to allow self-
petitioning,51 the battering husband could use both the threat not to
file the initial petition and the threat of withdrawing the petition
once it was filed to coerce the immigrant wife into meeting his de-
mands, including, but not limited to, abandoning the petition for
removal of the conditional status.52
Instead of offering protection, the IMFA, in its original form, ag-
gravated already pernicious domestic situations for immigrant
women by providing their assailants with control over whether they
would be permitted to remain in the United States. “The already
considerable barriers to escaping the abusive spouse become seem-
ingly insurmountable to a woman who is waiting for the lapse of the
two year period in order to complete the process of immigrating le-
gally.”53 Thus, the original IMFA provisions inadvertently provided a
framework under which battered immigrant spouses had the choice
of either remaining in abusive marriages until the conditions of their
resident status were removed, or leaving and risking deportation if
                                                                                                                 
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994); see also Michelle J. Anderson, A License to
Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401,
1416-17 (1993).  Even though the hardship waiver still does not apply if the initial petition
for conditional permanent residency is not filed, this problem is mitigated by allowing bat-
tered alien spouses to self-petition for conditional residency. See discussion supra Part
VI.A.
49. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, §
40701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953-55 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1994)); see also dis-
cussion supra Part VI.A.
50. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.1 (a)(3)(i)(A) (1997).
51. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 40701, 108 Stat. at 1953-
55; see also discussion supra Part VI.A.
52. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 557.
53. Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 854 (statement of Asian Women’s Shelter et
al.).
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the abusive sponsoring spouse withdrew the petition or the alien’s
waiver request was denied.54
IV.   THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990
In 1990, Congress amended the IMFA by enacting the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 (IMMACT).55 Supporters of women’s rights and
immigration reform had high expectations for the new amendments’
ability to cure the problems created and perpetuated by the IMFA.56
A.   Battered Spouse Waiver
Under the IMMACT, a battered spouse waiver is granted at the
discretion of the INS, provided the immigrant spouse demonstrates
that she entered into the qualifying marriage in good faith, either
she or her child was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty during
the marriage, and she was not at fault in failing to file the joint pe-
tition and scheduling the personal interview.57 Congress intended
                                                                                                                 
54. See Sandra D. Pressman, The Legal Issues Confronting Conditional Resident Ali-
ens Who Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives, 6 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 129, 134 (1995); see also 136 CONG. REC. H8642 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1990) (statement of Rep. Louise M. Slaughter) (concluding that the vagueness of the IMFA
places a battered immigrant woman in the dilemma of facing an abusive husband or risk-
ing deportation to a country that has ceased to be her home).
55. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
  The independent waivers do not address the issue of battered spouses and
children. . . . In addition, many states have no-fault divorce laws which make it
impossible for an alien spouse to establish that the marriage was terminated
for good cause. . . . Present law does not ensure that a battered alien spouse or child
will not be forced to remain in an abusive relationship for fear of deportation. . .
. The Committee believes that the creation of a battered spouse/child waiver
and changes to the good faith/good cause waiver will clarify Congressional in-
tent.
H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6731.
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that when the U.S. citizen or per-
manent resident spouse or parent engages in battering or cruelty against a
spouse or child, neither the spouse nor child should be entrapped in the abu-
sive relationship by the threat of losing their legal resident status.
Id. at 78.
56. See Immigration Act of 1989 (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 301 (1989) (statement of Nicholas DiMarzio, Executive Director, Migration
and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference); id. at 665-68 (statement of Rep. Louise
M. Slaughter); id. at 679-80 (letter submitted by Karen King, Ass’t Director, Younger
Women’s Club).
57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (1994). The INS implementing regulations specify
that
the phrase “was battered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty” includes,
but is not limited to, being the victim of any act or threatened act of violence,
including any forceful detention, which results or threatens to result in physi-
cal or mental injury. Psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including
rape, molestation, incest (if the victim is a minor) or forced prostitution shall be
considered acts of violence.
1997]                   IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD 687
that “[e]vidence to support a battered spouse/child waiver can in-
clude, but is not limited to, reports and affidavits from police, medi-
cal personnel, psychologists, school officials, and social service
agencies.”58 The House Report on the IMMACT explains that the
INS’s denial of a waiver is limited to “rare and exceptional circum-
stances such as when the alien poses a clear and significant detri-
ment to the national interest.”59 Notwithstanding congressional in-
tent, the INS has balanced the need for simple evidentiary require-
ments with the need to protect the borders of the United States from
fraudulent entry.60 Consequently, the INS regulations require that a
battered spouse or child suffer physical abuse or be a victim of
“extreme mental cruelty” to obtain relief under the statute.61
While the evidentiary requirements for establishing physical
abuse track congressional intent,62 the INS heightened the eviden-
tiary requirement for mental abuse by requiring a supporting
evaluation by a professional recognized in the field.63 This require-
ment is premised on the notion that INS officials are not competent
to evaluate mental health testimony given by “unlicensed” or
“untrained” experts.64 On the other hand, these same officials are
permitted to evaluate evidence of untrained experts as proof of
physical abuse.65
The battered spouse waiver is available regardless of the present
marital status of the petitioner.66 Additionally, the waiver is avail-
able for conditional residents who are still in the United States after
termination of their conditional status or after a court has ordered
deportation.67
B.   Elimination of the Good Cause and Initiation Requirements
The IMMACT removed from the hardship waiver provision the
requirement that the immigrant spouse prove the marriage was
                                                                                                                 
8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i) (1997).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 79 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6759.
59. Id. at 63.
60. “The service has balanced the need to make compliance with the evidentiary re-
quirements for the waiver as simple as possible against the need to ensure that unscrupu-
lous aliens do not take advantage of the waiver to obtain immigration benefits to which
they are not entitled.” Battered and Abused Conditional Resident, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,635,
22,636 (1991).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3) (1997).
62. See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iii); see also H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 79.
63. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1997). INS recognizes licensed clinical social work-
ers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(vii).
64. Id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv).
65. See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iii); see also H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 79.
66. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(ii) (1997) (“The conditional resident may apply for the
waiver regardless of his or her marital status.”).
67. See id.
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terminated for good cause.68 This change is a recognition that the
no-fault divorce laws of many states make it difficult for battered
spouses to show good cause.69 Also, the IMMACT eliminated the re-
quirement that the immigrant spouse initiate the divorce.70 No
longer can the citizen spouse prevent the conditional resident alien
from filing a waiver by being the first to file for divorce.71 The condi-
tional resident need only prove that she entered into the marriage in
good faith, the marriage was terminated by means other than death,
and she was not at fault in the failure to file a timely petition.72
C.   Confidentiality Provision
A confidentiality provision was included in the IMMACT to pre-
vent the battering spouse from inflicting more abuse upon the alien
spouse because of information disclosed in the waiver application.73
The regulations require a court order for the release of any of the in-
formation regarding the waiver application, but permit any of the in-
formation to be used to enforce immigration regulations or as evi-
dence in criminal proceedings.74
V.   PROBLEMS LEFT UNRESOLVED BY THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990
A.   Discretionary Nature of the Hardship and Battered Spouse
Waivers
The INS’s power to grant a hardship waiver or a battered spouse
waiver is discretionary.75 Without a guarantee that a waiver will be
granted if all the requirements are met, unpredictability will re-
sult.76 Thus, many aliens will view the waiver process as lacking in-
tegrity, and may, out of discouragement, choose not to file for a
waiver at all.77
B.   Good Faith Requirement
The IMMACT failed to change the requirement that an immi-
grant woman prove that she entered into the marriage in good
                                                                                                                 
68. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 701(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085.
69. See H.R. REP. NO. 723(I), at 51.
70. See Immigration Act § 701(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 5085.
71. See discussion supra Part III.B.
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (1994).
73. See id. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (“The [INS] shall, by regulation, establish measures to
protect the confidentiality of information concerning any abused alien spouse or child, in-
cluding information regarding the whereabouts of such spouse or child.”).
74. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(viii) (1997).
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1994).
76. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 557.
77. See id.
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faith.78 Under this provision, the U.S. citizen or LPR spouse can, out
of spite, rebut the battered spouse’s truthful assertion that the mar-
riage was entered into in good faith.79 If this perjury is successful in
preventing the abused spouse from meeting the burden of proof, the
battered spouse then would be ineligible for a hardship waiver.80
C.   Definitions of “Physical Battery” and “Extreme Mental Cruelty”
The definitions of “physical battery” and “extreme mental cruelty”
in the INS regulations are underinclusive:
The . . . [regulation] offers a single definition for both physical bat-
tering and extreme mental cruelty. While the definition includes
many types of abuse, it has several glaring omissions. For exam-
ple, the definition should be expanded to include “neglect” and
“deprivation”—categories of abuse that include failure to properly
provide for the child or spouse, deprivation of economic resources,
or medical deprivation. These are criminal offenses in many states,
and are certainly types of abuse from which conditional resident
spouses and children should be encouraged to escape without
risking deportation.81
Furthermore, while assigning a single definition to both physical
battery and extreme mental cruelty, the regulations give each differ-
ent evidentiary requirements.82 Physical battery may be supported
by nonexpert testimony,83 while extreme mental cruelty must be
supported by an expert recognized by the INS.84 “If an applicant
submits evidence sufficient to meet the physical abuse test, but the
INS determines the applicant has suffered extreme cruelty instead,
the consequences may be a loss of legal status.”85 To cure this prob-
lem, the INS should define “physical battery” and “extreme mental
cruelty” unambiguously.
D.   Problems of Proving Battery or Extreme Cruelty
Practitioners have indicated that the INS evidentiary require-
ments implementing the IMMACT are virtually impossible for many
abused aliens to satisfy.86 “[S]uch restrictive documentation re-
quirements create an access problem which undermines the protec-
                                                                                                                 
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (1994).
79. See O’Herron, supra note 10, at 556.
80. See id.
81. Martha F. Davis & Janet M. Calvo, INS Interim Rule Diminishes Protection for
Abused Spouses and Children, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 665, 668 (1991).
82. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(i) (1997).
83. See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iii).
84. See id. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv).
85. Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 668.
86. See Lee, supra note 4, at 797-98.
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tive intent of the waiver.”87 Many battered immigrant women may
not have access to the professionals required by the INS.88 Addi-
tionally, when they flee their homes, they are more likely to find
refuge with friends and family than with licensed professionals in
battered women’s shelters.89 Furthermore, the notion that INS offi-
cials are not competent to evaluate evidence of extreme mental cru-
elty provided by anyone other than professionals recognized in the
field90 is inconsistent with other immigration provisions. To illus-
trate, INS officials determine whether an alien seeking political
asylum has a “well-founded fear of persecution.”91 Moreover, an
asylum petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony alone may be enough
to support a showing of such a fear.92
The evidentiary requirements are also problematic because they
focus on the mental state of the abuse victim instead of the acts and
omissions of the abuser.93 The mental condition of the abused spouse
may reveal little of the internal trauma she experienced because
some women may be able to cope with or hide their feelings better
than others.94 As a result, a professional examination may reveal
little of the real abuse the spouse has experienced, while the testi-
mony of lay witnesses such as clergy, shelter workers, and others
can provide better evidence to prove extreme cruelty.95 “By focusing
on the victim’s subjective perception rather than objective evidence
of abusive behavior, the INS has created the proof problem that it
now claims justifies the need for professional affidavits.”96
E.   Inadequacy of Confidentiality Provision
The intended protective function of the IMMACT’s confidential-
ity provision is inadequate because they provide the INS with too
much discretion in instituting measures to protect confidentiality.97
While the regulations implementing the confidentiality provision
state, “Any information provided under this part may be used for the
purposes of enforcement of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act or
in any criminal proceeding,”98 they do not require the petitioning
                                                                                                                 
87. Id. at 798 (quoting Letter from Rep. Louise M. Slaughter to Richard Sloan, Direc-
tor of Policy Directives and Instructions Branch, INS (June 7, 1991)).
88. See Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 668.
89. See id.
90. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1997).
91. Id. § 208.13(b)(2)(i).
92. See id. § 208.13(a).
93. See id.
94. See Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 669.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (1994).
98. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(viii) (1997).
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spouse or the battering spouse to be the subject of or the defendant
in the criminal proceeding.99 Thus, any federal or state law enforce-
ment officer may access the information without any showing of
need.100 These weaknesses may discourage many battered immi-
grants from coming forward.
F.   The Need for Pre-Deprivation Notice and Post -Deprivation
Hearings
Although the INS regulations implementing the IMMACT do not
permit an appeal from the decision on an application for waiver, the
alien can seek a review of the decision in deportation proceedings.101
Nevertheless, under the three-prong due process test set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge ,102 a battered alien
spouse deserves more process than is provided for in the regulations.
Under the Mathews test, the INS should determine the process due
by weighing (1) the private interest affected by the government’s ac-
tions; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation from the government’s
current procedure; and (3) the value of additional procedures.103
The interest at stake is great. If the waiver is denied, the alien
loses documentation and her ability to work, and is subject to arrest
and deportation.104 The risk of erroneous deprivation is also great.
The abused alien may be unable to support her allegations if the
adjudicating officer only hears evidence documented by professionals
approved by the INS.105 Finally, more process, complete with
pre-deprivation notice and post-deprivation hearings, would not
overburden the government because the INS already undertakes in-
terviews of conditional resident applicants in some circumstances.106
VI.   VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994
After passage of the IMMACT, opportunities remained for abu-
sive spouses to use immigration laws and procedure as weapons
                                                                                                                 
99. See id.
100. See Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 669.
101. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(f) (1997); cf. id. § 204.2(c)(3)(iii) (allowing the right to appeal self-
petitions that are denied); see also discussion supra Part VI.D.
102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
103. See id. at 336.
104. See Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 670.
105. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1997) (“[A]ll waiver applications based upon claims
of extreme mental cruelty must be supported by the evaluation of a professional recognized
by the service as an expert in the field.”); see also Davis & Calvo, supra note 81, at 669
(“[A] professional’s affidavit may reveal nothing about the woman’s abuse while her own
affidavit and affidavits of witnesses, government authorities, clergy or others may clearly
establish that she was subject to extreme cruelty . . . .”).
106. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(d) (1997) (allowing the INS to require waiver applicants to
appear at interviews).
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against their battered alien spouses and children. In response, Con-
gress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (Crime Act),107 Title IV of which contained specific provisions
regarding immigrant women and children.108 These provisions re-
solve some of the deficiencies in the IMMACT by (1) allowing alien
spouses and children to self-petition for conditional permanent resi-
dency109 and (2) allowing for the suspension of deportation proceed-
ings in the case of an alien who is subject to deportation but has
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a citizen or LPR
spouse.110 These new provisions and their implementing regulations
should limit the ability of an abusive parent or spouse to use immi-
gration laws as a tool to continue battering and inflicting extreme
cruelty on their immigrant wives or children.
A.   Self-Petitioning
The Crime Act permits an alien spouse to file a petition herself
for classification as an immediate relative or second preference
based upon the marriage to the citizen or LPR spouse, respec-
tively.111 Under the INS regulations implementing the Crime Act,
the self-petitioner must (1) be the spouse of a citizen or LPR of the
United States; (2) be eligible for immigrant classification as an
“immediate relative” or “child” of a U.S. citizen or LPR; (3) be pres-
ently residing in the United States; (4) have once resided in the
United States with the citizen or LPR spouse; (5) have been battered
by or subjected to extreme cruelty perpetrated by the citizen or LPR
while married to the citizen or LPR; (6) be a person of good moral
character; (7) be a person whose deportation would result in extreme
hardship to him/herself or a child; and (8) be a person who entered
into the marriage in good faith.112 This self-petitioning mechanism
promises to remove the leverage the citizen or LPR spouse once had
as the only person authorized to file the initial petition for condi-
tional residence on behalf of the alien spouse.113
                                                                                                                 
107. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The House of Representatives initially proposed a bill
with provisions specifically intended to protect immigrant women from the inadequacies of
the IMMACT. See Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133, 103d Cong. §§ 241-43.
However, the Senate version of this bill did not contain similar provisions. See Janet M.
Calvo and Martha F. Davis, Congress Nears Approval of Legislation to Protect Abused Ali-
ens, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1665, 1669 (1993). Legislators then combined these bills to
draft the final conference version that appears in the Crime Act. See id.
108. See Crime Act §§ 40701-03, 108 Stat. at 1953-55.
109. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), (a)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (West Supp. 1996).
110. See id. § 1254(a)(3).
111. See id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii).
112. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i) (1997).
113. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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1.   Marriage Requirement
The regulations require the self-petitioning spouse to be married
to the citizen or LPR spouse at the time he or she files the peti-
tion.114 In cases where divorce or nullification occurs between the
time the battered spouse files the petition and the time the petition
is approved, however, the approval will stand despite the legal ter-
mination of the marriage.115 Nevertheless, if the self-petitioner re-
marries before becoming an LPR, the remarriage will result in de-
nial of the petition.116 The remarriage demonstrates that the spouse
does not need the “protections of section 40701 of the Crime Bill to
equalize the balance of power in the relationship with the abuser.”117
These rules are intended to place control of the self-petitioning proc-
ess in the hands of the petitioning spouse.118
2.   Residence Requirement
To meet the residency requirement of the regulations, an alien
must have resided with the abusive spouse in the United States.119
However, no time limit exists regarding how long the alien has to
live with the citizen or LPR spouse.120 Presumably, one week is suf-
ficient. In addition, the alien must reside in the United States at the
time the petition is filed.121 The residence requirements are liberally
structured to allow the alien to escape an abusive home and not risk
becoming ineligible for relief under this section.
3.   Requirements for Battery or Extreme Cruelty
To meet the requirements for battery or extreme cruelty, the
abuse must have occurred during the self-petitioner’s marriage to
the abuser.122 The alien or the alien’s child must have been the sub-
ject of the abuse.123 Any other abusive acts do not qualify under this
provision, unless it can be established that the acts were deliber-
ately used to perpetuate extreme cruelty against the alien or the
                                                                                                                 
114. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i)(A) (1997).
115. See id. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii) (“After the self-petition has been properly filed, the legal
termination of the marriage will have no effect on the decision made on the self-petition.”).
116. See id. (“The self-petitioner’s remarriage, however, will be a basis for the denial of
a pending self-petition.”).
117. See 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,062 (1996).
118. See id.
119. See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(v) (1997).
120. See id.; see also 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,065 (“A qualified self-petitioner may have
moved to the United States only recently, made any number of trips abroad, or resided
with the abuser in the United States for only a short time.”).
121. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(v) (1997).
122. See id. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi).
123. See id.
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alien’s child.124 Although the regulations list different types of quali-
fying abuse,125 other abusive acts that may not initially appear vio-
lent may qualify under the provision because they demonstrate an
overall pattern of violence.126 Moreover, abusive acts that occurred
during time periods not covered under the provision may be included
with the petition to demonstrate a pattern of abuse and violence and
to bolster claims that the abuse actually occurred.127 In short, the
regulations regarding battery and extreme cruelty loosen some of
the tighter restrictions of the IMMACT and the IMFA.
4.   Evidentiary Requirements
Both the Crime Act and its implementing regulations direct the
INS to consider any “credible evidence” relevant to the self-
petition.128 However, this provision gives the INS sole discretion to
determine what evidence is credible and what weight to give that
evidence.129  Under the regulations, the battered spouse must pro-
vide documentary evidence of status including, but not limited to (1)
the legal relationship to the citizen abuser; (2) the abuser’s immi-
gration or LPR citizenship status; (3) the self-petitioner and the
abuser have resided together in the United States; (4) good moral
character; and (5) a good faith marriage.130
While any relevant credible evidence supporting the petition will
be accepted, the self-petitioner is “encouraged to submit primary
evidence whenever possible.”131 Primary evidence of the abuser’s
U.S. citizenship or lawful permanent residence includes a birth cer-
tificate, a valid U.S. passport, statements issued by U.S. consular
officials, and certificates issued by INS.132 In the event no primary
evidence is available, the battered spouse must present secondary
evidence such as a baptismal certificate, sworn affidavits, early
school records, and census records.133 In the event that neither pri-
mary nor secondary evidence is available, the INS will attempt to
electronically verify the proper status of the spouse, child, and/or
                                                                                                                 
124. See id.; see also 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 13,065 (1996).
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (1997) (“Psychological or sexual abuse or exploita-
tion, including rape, molestation, incest (if the victim is a minor), or forced prostitution
shall be considered acts of violence.”).
126. See id.
127. See id. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (“[P]roof of non-qualifying abuse may only be used to es-
tablish a pattern of abuse and violence and to support a claim that qualifying abuse also
occurred.”).
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(H) (West Supp. 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(i).
129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(H) (West Supp. 1996).
130. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(ii), (iii), (v), (vii) (1997).
131. Id. § 204.2(c)(2)(i).
132. See id. § 204.1(g)(1).
133. See id. § 204.1(g)(2).
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abuser from information contained in computerized INS records.134
However, if INS cannot discover sufficient information, it will review
the petition based upon the information submitted by the
self-petitioner.135
Evidence of battering and extreme cruelty may be established by
a broad array of sources. “Evidence of abuse may include, but is not
limited to, reports and affidavits from police, judges and other court
officials, medical personnel, school officials, clergy, social workers,
and other social service agency personnel.”136 The INS will accept
other forms of evidence and determine its credibility and probative
value.137
5.   Procedural Safeguards
The INS provides due process with its preliminary and final de-
cisions regarding the self-petitions. Unfavorable preliminary deci-
sions are communicated to the petitioning alien in writing.138 The
alien is given the opportunity to supplement the application with
additional information or arguments before the INS makes a final
decision.139 If the preliminary decision is adverse to the petitioner
and “is based on derogatory information of which the petitioner is
unaware, the self-petitioner will be offered an opportunity to rebut
the derogatory information . . . .”140 If the final decision is adverse,
she will be notified of the basis for the decision and of the right to
appeal.141 This provision should sufficiently meet the Mathews due
process test.142
B.   Suspension of Deportation
Congress enacted the Crime Act provision allowing the INS to
suspend deportation of battered immigrant spouses143 because
“[d]omestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in
                                                                                                                 
134. See id. § 204.1(g)(3).
135. See id. Preliminary INS field-office instructions provided that more weight would
be given to evidence contained in court records, medical reports, police reports, and other
official documents. See INS Instructs on New Battered Spouse Provision in Crime Bill, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 178, 178 (1995).
136. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (1997).
137. See id.
138. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(3)(ii) (1997).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. § 204.2(c)(3)(iii).
142. See supra text accompanying note 103. Nevertheless, the relative lack of process
regarding applications for hardship waivers, see discussion supra Part IV.F, still remains,
see 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(f) (1997).
143. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
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marriages where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizens
[sic] legal status depends on his or her marriage to the abuser.”144
This provision responds to the situation in which
[a]busers generally refuse to file relative petitions for their closest
family members because they find it easier to control relatives who
do not have lawful immigration status. These family members are
less likely to report the abuse or leave the abusive environment
because they fear deportation . . . .145
To be eligible for suspension of deportation, the alien must (1) have
been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than three years; (2) have been battered or subject to ex-
treme cruelty in the United States by a spouse who is a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident; (3) have been a person of good moral
character during their time in the United States; and (4) be a person
whose deportation would result in extreme hardship.146 Thus, the
batterer should not be able to use the threat of deportation to coerce
the alien into remaining in an abusive relationship.
VII.   PROBLEMS LEFT UNRESOLVED BY THE CRIME ACT
Despite the improvements contained in the Crime Act, three ma-
jor barriers to freeing immigrant women from abusive relationships
still remain in place: (1) the absence of work authorization; (2) the
potential adverse consequences of divorce; and (3) the INS’s discre-
tion in determining the weight and credibility of evidence.
A.   Lack of Work Authorization
The Crime Act fails to provide work authorization for either un-
documented self-petitioning aliens or aliens seeking suspension of
deportation.147 Usually, control of finances is a major missile in the
abuser’s arsenal.148 Additionally, many abused aliens lack work
skills and jobs outside the home.149 As a result, survival without the
financial support of the citizen spouse may prove impossible. Balanc-
ing the probability of ongoing abuse against the probability of not
surviving on one’s own, the abused spouse may elect to remain
                                                                                                                 
144. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
145. 61 Fed. Reg. 13,061, 13,062 (1994).
146. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
147. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) (1997) (failing to include undocumented self-petitioning
aliens or aliens seeking suspension of deportation in the listing of aliens authorized to ac-
cept employment incident to their status).
148. See Lee, supra note 4, at 785.
149. See id. at 785-86.
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home. Thus, this omission may frustrate the ability to escape an
abusive home.
B.   Effect of Divorce
When it enacted the Crime Act, Congress intended to remove di-
vorce either as the sole basis or a major factor in considering the
self-petition. The House Report stated:
Under current law and regulation, divorce results in the automatic
revocation of an immediate relative petition and a second prefer-
ence petition. This section closes a loophole in the statute and en-
sures that in the case of abused spouses and abused children who
are self-petitioning, divorce may not be the basis for revocation of
the petition.150
The INS rule requires the self-petitioner to be married to the abuser
at the time the self-petition is filed.151 After the self-petition has
been properly filed, termination of the marriage will have no effect
on the decision made on the self-petition.152
Generally, the INS requirement that the self-petitioner be mar-
ried at the time the self-petition is filed fails to acknowledge the
practical realities of an abusive and violent marriage by allowing di-
vorce to work against the self-petitioner. Divorce is often the key in
allowing the abused alien and the alien’s children to receive real
protection from an abusive spouse because police and the court sys-
tem are more likely to enforce criminal laws such as stalking, bat-
tery, and harassment after the marriage has been legally termi-
nated.153
Furthermore, the INS rule may be in direct conflict with the leg-
islative intent behind the IMMACT confidentiality provision. Con-
gress designed the confidentiality provision to prevent the battering
spouse from intercepting the communications between immigrant
officials and petitioning battered aliens.154 Logically, if current
regulations make it tougher for the abused alien to leave home, the
chances of the battering spouse intercepting the communications are
greatly increased.
                                                                                                                 
150. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 38 (1993).
151. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i)(a) (1997).
152. See id. § 204.2(c)(1)(ii).
153. See Janet Calvo, The Violence Against Women Act: An Opportunity for the Justice
Department to Confront Domestic Violence, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 485, 489 (1995).
154. See supra Part IV.C.
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C.   INS Discretion in Determining the Weight and Credibility of
Evidence
The greatest impediment to the abused alien’s ability to benefit
from the self-petitioning provision of the Crime Act is the discretion
available to the INS in determining the weight and credibility of
evidence.155 Although “any credible evidence relevant to the petition”
will be considered, “self-petitioners are encouraged to submit pri-
mary evidence whenever possible.”156 Furthermore, the regulations
state that “[t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the
weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of
the Service.”157 Thus, if the INS gives great weight to official docu-
ments and almost no weight to other evidence, it could effectively
negate Congress’s intent that any credible evidence be accepted.158
In contrast to the INS regulations, the House Report directed
“the [INS] to consider any credible evidence submitted in support of
hardship waivers based on battering or extreme cruelty whether or
not the evidence is supported by an evaluation by a licensed mental
health professional.”159 Nevertheless, these instructions were not in-
corporated into the language of the Crime Act provisions. As evi-
denced by the regulations, Congress’s failure to include the appro-
priate language in the Act has provided INS with the opportunity to
impose more stringent requirements upon abused aliens.160
VIII.   RECOMMENDATIONS
Since enacting the IMFA, Congress has corrected many of the
flaws and omissions that locked aliens into abusive homes for fear of
deportation. However, significant problems remain because Con-
gress left so many loopholes in the legislation designed to correct the
flaws in the IMFA.
A.   Repealing the IMFA
Spending more time, money, and energy reforming the IMFA is
futile when Congress can eliminate its harmful effects with one
quick blow by repealing its provisions. This approach is justified be-
                                                                                                                 
155. The author is not questioning the INS’s credibility and fairness. However, indi-
viduals should be able to rely upon a clear, objective, and nonarbitrary standard.
156. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(i) (1997).
157. Id.
158. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 38 (1993).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. See 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(3)(iv) (1997) (“[A]ll waiver applications based upon claims
of extreme mental cruelty must be supported by the evaluation of a professional recognized
by the Service as an expert in the field.”).
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cause the premise of the IMFA—that marriage fraud is a significant
threat to the United States—has been proven inaccurate.
The IMFA is based upon statistical data that was misrepresen-
tative and misleading. When the IMFA was enacted, INS Commis-
sioner Alan C. Nelson, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee
Hearing on Immigration and Refugee Policy, stated that marriage
and fiancée frauds posed “significant threats to the integrity of law-
ful immigration procedures.”161 When asked to estimate how many
persons were involved in fraudulent or invalid marriages, Nelson
stated that “based on a preliminary survey . . . we believe as much
as 30 percent, which is an extremely high figure, of the spouse rela-
tionships may be fraudulent.”162 The survey figure was later esti-
mated to be thirty to forty percent.163 The Commissioner’s dire pre-
dictions did not go unchallenged during the hearing. Jules Coven,
president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, rebut-
ted: “[I] would be extremely surprised to learn, if it could be shown
statistically, that more than one or two percent of the ‘green cards’
issued annually on the basis of marriage involved fraud.”164 Just
over a year later, the House Judiciary Committee adopted a report
in favor of the legislation.165
Coven’s suspicions were later supported by the findings of a
North Carolina federal district court in Manwani v. INS .166 In Man-
wani, the INS conceded the invalidity of the survey estimating that
one-third of immigration marriages were fraudulent.167 In conduct-
ing that study, the INS collected data in only three cities.168 Moreo-
ver, the thirty-percent figure was only based upon the number of
cases that field investigators in those cities suspected were fraudu-
lent; they were not cases where actual fraud had been proven.169 In
fact, the INS had never determined the exact number of cases of
known fraud before Congress enacted the IMFA.170 Nevertheless, the
                                                                                                                 
161. IMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson).
162. Id. at 35.
163. See id. at 69 (statement of Roger L. Conner, Executive Director, Federation for
American Immigration Reform).
164. Id. at 78 (statement of Jules C. Coven, President, American Immigration Lawyers
Association).
165. During a floor debate on the legislation, Representative Romano L. Mazzoli cited
an internal INS study claiming that one-third of marriages in INS cases are fraudulent.
See 132 CONG. REC. H27,015 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Romano L. Maz-
zoli).
166. 736 F. Supp. 1367 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
167. See id. at 1373.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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House subcommittee accepted the INS’s incorrect estimate and used
it as a basis to gain support for passage of the legislation.171
Furthermore, the Manwani court found that Congress relied
upon the estimate despite its knowledge of the questionable nature
of the figures. “[H]igh ranking officials in the INS Central Office
were aware of and had discussed the limitations of the [survey] in
1984 and knew that the [survey] was not a valid or reliable survey of
marriage fraud.”172 David Nachtsheim, the INS official responsible
for designing and overseeing the survey, acknowledged that the data
would not be a reliable indication of the need for legislative
changes.173 Thus, instead of sham marriages, the only proven sham
so far has been sham legislation. “The result has been a piece of
legislation that was not necessary and that has had the devastating
effect of endangering the lives of many immigrant women.”174
B.   Enhanced Enforcement of Pre -IMFA Procedures
The problem with pre-IMFA provisions was not marriage fraud,
but rather a lack of resources and officials to enforce already ade-
quate procedures for granting status based upon marriage to U.S.
citizens or LPRs. Before passing the IMFA, Congress was encour-
aged to provide for enhanced enforcement of the present marriage
fraud regulations, not to pass broad, sweeping legislation.175 “From
our perspective, the answer really lies in enhancing our existing
anti-fraud programs, which means, more training, continuing im-
provement in our information-sharing, and operational coopera-
tion.”176 Nevertheless, Congress elected to cure these personnel and
resource problems by passing a bill that created more difficulties for
alien spouses and immigration officials than it solved.177
Furthermore, the INS has demonstrated the ability to implement
better enforcement mechanisms for the pre-IMFA provisions. Ver-
non D. Penner, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa
Services, testified that in cases of marriage fraud involving U.S.
service personnel stationed overseas, the INS has worked with mili-
                                                                                                                 
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. O’Herron, supra note 10, at 565.
175. See IMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 31 (statement of Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State
for Visa Services Vernon D. Penner, Jr.). “In considering such a significant departure from
existing provisions of law, careful consideration should be given to whether enforcement of
existing law might not render the provision unnecessary.” Id.
176. Id. at 32. There is no evidence that Congress or the INS conducted any further in-
vestigation to consider Penner’s suggestion before or after passage of the IMFA.
177. If pre-IMFA problems were personnel-related, Congress could not reasonably have
thought that giving the shorthanded and underfunded INS more work with new duties
would solve the problems.
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tary authorities, chaplains, and civilian personnel officers in estab-
lishing a military clearance process that was “a strong deterrent” to
marriage fraud.178 No statute was necessary to correct military mar-
riage fraud. Likewise, Congress should simply have provided offi-
cials with appropriate funding and training to inform interested
parties and to enforce the pre-IMFA procedures for detecting and de-
terring marriage fraud.
IX.   CONCLUSION
Although designed to deter marriage fraud, the IMFA has become
a weapon for oppressing alien spouses and children. The underlying
premise of the IMFA—that thirty percent of alien spouses marry
U.S. citizens solely to gain citizenship—has been deemed incorrect
and even fraudulent.179 Support exists for more enforcement of
pre-IMFA procedures.180 While Congress has steadily attempted to
remedy the adverse effects of the IMFA, these attempts have fallen
short. In light of the faulty statistical data and the disastrous effects
the IMFA has had on alien spouses, the only logical and ethical so-
lution is for legislators to admit their misjudgment181 and repeal the
IMFA.
                                                                                                                 
178. IMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 38 (statement of Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of State for
Visa Services Vernon D. Penner, Jr.).
179. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
181. Supporters of the IMFA already have admitted that they “may have gone too far
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